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Abstract 
Although executive function (EF) and emotion regulation (ER) are both self-regulatory abilities 
which share common neural substrates and have been linked to common mental health outcomes, 
few research studies have looked at the direct relationship or considered common underlying 
factors that may influence this relationship. The current study examined the relationships 
between ER strategy use, EFs, and their joint and independent effects on the experience of 
emotions and psychological distress in an undergraduate sample. In the current study we 
assessed ER, emotional reactivity, the experience of affect and psychological distress using self-
report. We measured individuals on a battery of EF tasks. Based on previous research we 
predicted that increased use of cognitive reappraisal would be related to better inhibition and 
working memory and healthier psychological functioning. Conversely, we predicted that 
increased use of expressive suppression would be related to weaker inhibition and working 
memory and increased reporting of psychological distress. Additionally, we predicted that 
emotional reactivity would moderate the effects of EF and ER on psychological outcomes. 
Results indicated that neither inhibition nor working memory were associated with ER strategy 
use. Conversely, increased use of cognitive reappraisal predicted higher positive emotions, while 
increased use of expressive suppression predicted higher negative emotions and increased 
psychological distress. Furthermore, better inhibition was predictive of increased psychological 
distress. Finally, emotional reactivity added predictive power to negative affect and 
psychological distress and there was a moderating effect of emotional reactivity on the predictive 
ability of inhibition on negative affect. We discuss the research implications of these findings 
and suggest directions for future research in this area. 
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Introduction 
This literature review examines executive functions (EF), emotion regulation (ER) and research 
supporting an association between these two concepts. Developmental trajectories and neural 
substrates of both EF and ER are discussed to potentially highlight some common underlying 
features of these constructs. In addition, common correlates of EF and ER, such as psychological 
distress and emotional reactivity are reviewed. 
1. Executive Functioning 
Executive functions are typically viewed as processes used to self-regulate one’s thoughts and 
behaviours towards a goal (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). The following reviews unitary, 
componential, and integrative perspectives of EF. It should be noted that, though not a complete 
analysis of perspectives of EF, this review attempts to evaluate and consolidate the most 
influential models to date and discuss them in a developmental framework. 
1.1 Unitary models of EF 
Executive function was traditionally conceptualized as a unitary construct in which a singular 
underlying ability controlled goal-oriented thoughts and behaviours (Goldstein, Naglieri, 
Princiotta & Otero, 2014). Ideas regarding the nature of this unitary ability were influenced by 
early work conducted by Broadbent (1958) using a dichotic listening task. In this task, 
participants were asked to answer one question after being presented with two questions 
simultaneously. Participants were more accurate at answering the question correctly when they 
were instructed to attend to a question asked through one side of the headphones and to neglect 
what was being asked through the other side of the headphones (Broadbent, 1958). This finding 
led to the inference that when participants are directed to selectively attend to one stimulus rather 
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than another, they can better control which information to attend to by blocking out task-
irrelevant information.  
The notion of a limited capacity attentional system suggests that some kind of cognitive 
processing enables us to actively attend to certain information while filtering out other 
information in order to effectively complete a goal. Posner and Boies’ (1971) model of attention 
suggested that this processing capacity was determined by a central limited capacity system 
which controlled attentional sub processes such as alerting and selectivity. Alerting prepares 
one’s attention for deployment towards an external or internal stimulus, whereas selectivity 
refers to the ability to attend to certain stimuli while ignoring others. For example, when an 
individual hears a loud sound, their alerting system may queue them to attend to the location of 
that stimulus and the selectivity system would enable them to focus on the loud sound rather than 
competing sources of information in the environment. In this model, the central limited capacity 
system is synonymous with EF.  
Following Posner and Boies’ research on attention, Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) classic model 
of working memory was postulated as being central to goal completion. Their model was 
initially based upon Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) model of memory which suggested that 
sensory information that was attended to and rehearsed in short-term memory was eventually 
encoded into long-term memory. Thus inherent in this model was the assumption that if the 
short-term encoding system was damaged then information would not make it into long-term 
memory. However, brain injury patients with impairments to short-term memory areas were still 
capable of encoding information into long-term memory (Shallice & Warrington, 1970). 
Moreover, dual-task experiments where participants were required to do two working memory 
tasks simultaneously suggested the presence of two distinct temporary stores dedicated to verbal 
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and visual-spatial information, as participants were able to perform above chance levels on the 
secondary working memory task provided that it did not tap into the same store (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974). Furthermore, research by Posner and Boies (1971) found that the encoding of 
visual information did not interfere with performance on alerting and selectivity tasks, 
suggesting that encoding does not interfere with processing capacity and that encoding of 
sensory information relies on a system separate from that of executive attention. Accordingly, 
Baddeley and Hitch expanded upon the short-term store put forth by Atkinson and Shiffrin by 
suggesting a new model that was used to temporarily store and manipulate sensory information 
which consisted of three components. This new model of memory was referred to as working 
memory and consisted of two slave systems, the visuo-spatial sketchpad and the phonological 
loop, which were controlled by an attentional system called the central executive (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974).  The visuo-spatial sketchpad was thought to be responsible for holding and 
manipulating visual information, while the phonological loop was thought to be used for 
temporary storage and manipulation of verbal information. The central executive was proposed 
to be a primary tenet of EF. Accordingly, the central executive was conceptualized as a system 
that directs attention to and temporarily stores information from the two slave systems (Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974). More recently, Baddeley has suggested that the central executive has several 
other functions, including more of an attentional focusing role that is similar to that proposed by 
Posner and Boies, as well as a role in long-term memory retrieval (Baddeley, 1996). Finally, the 
central executive has been related to the supervisory attention system postulated by Norman and 
Shallice (1986) which is described below.  
In contrast to the models suggested by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and Posner and Boise (1971), 
which viewed executive attention in its relation to perceptual stimuli, Norman and Shallice’s 
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(1986) model, known as the supervisory attention system (SAS), focused more internally on the 
mind’s control of action. According to this model, in any given situation we activate various 
schemata that are used to guide our actions more or less automatically. However, a resolution 
system is required when many schemas are activated at the same time, or when an active schema 
conflicts with a desired goal (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Norman and Shallice (1986) postulated 
that internal schemas have organizational values that create an internal hierarchy to reduce 
conflict, although these values can be indirectly influenced through motivational factors and 
attentional control resources. This latter influence on control of action is referred to as the SAS 
and is often required during completion of novel and complex tasks (Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
Norman and Shallice further suggested that this control of action is applied consciously and as 
such will increase the time needed to complete the task. As conscious control processes are 
thought to be completed one after another and not concurrently, the more conscious control that 
is applied by the SAS will further modulate the time needed to complete the task (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986).  
None of the unitary models described thus far were intended to explain EF in a developmental 
context; however, there are two well-known unitary conceptualizations of EF that have been 
developed with a developing population in mind. One of the most influential developmental 
models of EF is the cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory devised by Zelazo and Frye 
(1998). Based on the findings of several variations of card sorting tasks, Zelazo and colleagues 
have found that preschoolers aged 3 to 4 perform poorly when asked to switch their sorting 
criteria while 5-year olds successfully switch between sorts (e.g., first sorting by colour, then 
sorting by shape: Jacques, Zelazo, Kirkham & Semcesen, 1999; Zelazo, Frye & Rapus, 1996; 
Zelazo & Frye, 1998; Zelazo, Muller, Frye & Marcovitch, 2003). Alternative explanations of 
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preschoolers’ performance on this task, involving limitations in their working memory and/or 
inhibition, do not fully account for these findings, as other studies have demonstrated that young 
children are able to correctly identify which rule they are supposed to be following despite 
perseverating on this task (Zelazo et al., 1996), can successfully sort by colour and shape at the 
same time (i.e., sorting cards into four piles as opposed to two: Zelazo & Frye, 1998), and 
perseverate even after being exposed to only one pre-switch trial (Zelazo & Frye, 1998). Thus, 
according to CCC theory, EF reflects the ability to represent rules in a hierarchical fashion, 
starting with being able to represent a single rule and adding increasing layers of complexity 
through development (Zelazo & Frye, 1998). 
A similar developmental conceptualization of EF is provided by Munakata, Snyder and Chatam 
(2012), who propose that the development of abstract goal representations and increases in 
cognitive flexibility coincide with successful goal-directed behaviours. According to their model, 
we are initially regulated through external sources such as environmental cues and other 
individuals. For example, an infant will look towards a parent’s voice, or a child will go to their 
room when instructed to do so. These externally motivated cues are said to be reactive forms of 
regulation and infants and young children are considered to be unable to effectively represent 
future-oriented goals (Munakata et al., 2012). As we develop, it is suggested that we become 
increasingly internally self-regulated and develop the ability to represent goals in a proactive 
way. As such, we may use internal cues, such as self-directed speech to switch between and plan 
tasks effectively (Munakata et al., 2012).  
The unitary models of EF that have been presented thus far all involve one underlying ability that 
contributes to success in the regulation of goal-oriented behaviour. These models suggest that EF 
is a limited capacity system that facilitates processing of and responses to goal-relevant 
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information – particularly in the presence of irrelevant and/or competing information – and that 
may be mastered via developmental changes in mental representations of complex rules and 
goals.  
1.2 A componential model of EF 
In contrast to the unitary models discussed above, componential models of EF posit that multiple 
processes subserve EF.  One influential componential model has been proposed by Nigg (2000). 
Though his model focuses on inhibition as being central to the executive construct, it identifies 4 
types of effortful inhibition systems that comprise EF. These inhibitory systems consist of motor 
and cognitive interference control, behavioural inhibition, and oculomotor inhibition. Nigg 
(2000) also outlines automatic and personality models of inhibition. As EF is typically related to 
conscious control of thoughts and behaviour, the latter models will not be reviewed here. 
The first and perhaps most well researched form of effortful inhibition is interference control. 
This can involve both actively suppressing external stimuli from interfering with an action and 
purposefully ignoring internal information that may disrupt task performance (Nigg, 2000). An 
example of the former has been referred to by Nigg as motor inhibition. This form of inhibition 
was postulated due to the observation that individuals take longer to respond when in the 
presence of external distractors (Nigg, 2000). Another example of interference control is 
cognitive inhibition. This type of inhibition refers to the suppression of irrelevant cognitions to 
maintain available cognitive resources such as working memory or visual attention (Nigg, 2000). 
Another type of inhibition described through Nigg’s model is behavioural inhibition. 
Behavioural inhibition requires the suppression of a prepotent, but incorrect response to a 
stimulus (Nigg, 2000). This means that individuals must actively stop themselves from 
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performing an overlearned and somewhat automatic response. Although tasks assessing 
interference control often include the suppression of a prepotent response, these tasks are 
separable from behavioural inhibition tasks in the sense that they also require participants to 
actively ignore distractor stimuli to make a decision (Nigg, 2000).  
The final effortful control of inhibition suggested by Nigg (2000) is oculomotor inhibition. This 
view of inhibition involves the effortful suppression of reflexive eye movements to novel, but 
irrelevant visual targets. This would also include the inhibition of saccadic eye movements to 
information in one’s periphery which may not demand our attention externally, such as looking 
towards a flashing light, or hearing a loud noise. Rather we may orient to these locations out of a 
failure to inhibit internal desires to attend to them.   
In general, Nigg’s (2000) model of inhibition proposes that effortful inhibition represents a 
complex set of executive abilities that assist with goal completion. While unitary models of EF 
propose that a single function controls our thoughts and actions towards goals, Nigg (2000) 
suggests that multiple systems of inhibitory control determine our ability to successfully pursue a 
goal.   
1.3 An integrative framework of EF 
An alternative view to the unitary and componential views of EF is an integrative perspective of 
EF. According to Miyake and colleagues’ (2000) unity and diversity framework, EF is a set of 
interrelated, but separable constructs that aid individuals in the effortful self-regulation of their 
thoughts and actions towards a specific goal.  
In their review of current studies using performance measures of EF, Miyake and colleagues 
(2000) note that correlations between various executive tasks tend to be low (i.e., < 0.4) and that 
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exploratory factor analyses of these tasks typically find more than one factor. These findings 
suggest that EF is not unitary. Owing to EF’s non-unitary nature, the authors also noted that 
performance measures of EF have a task impurity problem such that each executive task 
necessarily measures more than what it is specified to assess. Moreover, the authors observed 
that many tasks assessing EF have low internal reliability, which further indicates that they 
measure more than just what they are supposed to measure. To overcome the task impurity 
problem posed by performance measures of EF, the authors modeled the unique variance from 
each executive task and used the ensuing latent factors in confirmatory factor analysis (Miyake et 
al., 2000).  
The three major factors that Miyake and colleagues (2000) focused on were inhibition of 
prepotent responses, updating and monitoring of working memory representations, and shifting 
between task demands. Inhibition refers to the deliberate process of stopping oneself from 
performing a prepotent response and is similar to Nigg’s (2000) description of behavioural 
inhibition. Updating includes actively updating, monitoring and coding task-relevant 
information. Rather than passively storing and maintaining information, as is suggested in 
Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) conceptualization of working memory, updating also includes the 
ability to manipulate the contents of working memory (Miyake et al., 2000). Lastly, shifting is 
the ability to switch attention between tasks or mental sets, which requires individuals to 
disengage from an irrelevant task or mental set in order to engage in a relevant task or mental set, 
and is similar to the supervisory attention system postulated by Norman and Shallice (1986). 
Miyake et al. (2000) focus on these three executive skills because they have been well studied, 
are viewed as being more central to the executive construct, and relatedly, are thought to be 
required for more complex forms of EF. Inhibition, updating, and shifting are believed to be 
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heavily supported by the frontal lobes, based on brain lesion, neuropsychological and 
neurophysiological studies (Casey et al., 1997; Everling & Fischer, 1998; Goldman-Rakic, 1996; 
Guitton, Buchtel & Douglas, 1985; Kiefer et al., 1998; Perret, 1974; Posner & Raichle, 1994; 
Smith & Jonides, 1999; Stuss, Eskes & Foster).  
Confirmatory factor analysis supported a three-factor model of executive function. The three-
factor model with inter-related factors was a significantly better fit than a model in which all 
three factors were independent, suggesting that the three executive skills are separable but share 
a significant amount of variance and are thus better understood when analyzed together (Miyake 
et al., 2000).  
1.4 Development of EF 
Miyake and colleagues’ (2000) model of EF was developed using data from young adults and – 
unlike models put forward by Zelazo and colleagues and Munkata and colleagues – does not 
attempt to explain how EF unfolds between infancy and young adulthood. Nonetheless, the 3-
factor model of EF put forward by Miyake et al. has been replicated in children as young as 6 
years of age and age-related improvements in the 3 core EF skills has been studied extensively in 
children and adolescents (Huizing, Dolan & van der Molen, 2006; Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra & 
Pulkkinen, 2003; McAuley & White, 2010; Van der Ven, Kroesbergen, Boom & Leseman, 
2013).  
One study examining the structure and development of EF was conducted by Huizinga et al. 
(2006), using an approach similar to that of Miyake et al. (2000). This study was conducted with 
individuals 7-21 years of age, who were administered tasks assessing core EF skills. Composites 
of working memory and shifting were significantly correlated, but only moderately so, which 
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lends support to a developmental unity and diversity model similar to the adult model developed 
by Miyake and colleagues (2000). Contrary to expectation, however, the inhibitory tasks did not 
converge on a single construct which may indicate that inhibition is multi-dimensional during 
development. Regarding age-related change in executive skills, the authors found that working 
memory had the most protracted rate of development and did not plateau until age 15. Shifting 
had the second longest rate of development, as shift costs decreased significantly until 11 years 
of age (Huizinga et al., 2006). When looking at individual inhibitory tasks, performance on the 
Eriksen Flanker and Stop-signal tasks reached adult levels around age 11, while performance on 
the Stroop task did not show a developmental trend and was more associated with age related 
improvements in processing speed (Huizinga et al., 2006). Composites of working memory, 
shifting, the Eriksen Flanker task and the Stop-signal tasks were also related to basic speed. 
However, these age-related changes remained significant even when controlling for basic speed. 
These results suggest that composites of working memory and shifting, and individual tasks of 
inhibition develop at somewhat different rates, while remaining correlated with each other, 
which offers additional support for the unity and diversity framework (Miyake et al., 2000). It 
also implies that these abilities become separable at different ages through the differential 
development of each ability.  
Consistent with these results, a similar study by Lehto and colleagues in a sample of children and 
adolescents aged 8 to 13 found that shifting and working memory developed significantly with 
age while inhibition did not (Lehto et al., 2003). Additionally, in support of Miyake and 
colleagues unity and diversity framework, the researchers found that a three-factor model of EF 
including working memory, inhibition, and shifting fit the data better than a unitary or two-factor 
model of EF (Lehto et al., 2003). Based on the aforementioned developmental research, it would 
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seem that working memory and shifting have the most protracted developmental course and that 
inhibition may see the greatest improvements prior to age seven.  
Another developmental research study consistent with the unity and diversity framework of EF 
carried out by McAuley and White (2010) found that inhibition, working memory and processing 
speed are separable abilities across participants aged 6-24. Results of confirmatory factor 
analysis across all ages suggested that a three-factor model of EF including processing speed, 
response inhibition, and working memory fit better than a unitary model of EF, or any two-factor 
models (McAuley & White, 2010). Additionally, McAuley and White (2010) found significant 
increases in these abilities with age, with the most marked increases occurring from early to late 
childhood. However, when the effects of processing speed were controlled for, only the linear 
effect of age on working memory remained significant. This is consistent with work by Huizinga 
and colleagues which found that working memory, inhibition and shifting have a protracted 
course of development which is largely mediated by concurrent increases processing speed 
(McAuley & White, 2010). This study also replicates and extends the findings from previous 
research suggesting that EF’s are separable constructs even as young as six years of age 
(Huizinga et al., 2006; Lehto et al., 2003). 
A meta-analysis by Best and Miller (2010) has conducted an in-depth examination of 
developmental models of EF and has found similar results to the aforementioned research 
studies. Regarding inhibitory control, results seem to indicate that inhibition develops greatly in 
early childhood and reaches a ceiling between ages 7 and 12. Studies looking at working 
memory found that working memory makes significant improvements until 16 years of age (Best 
& Miller, 2010). Concerning the development of shifting, Best and Miller (2010) report that 
12 
 
developmental studies have found considerable change in set shifting ability from around age 4 
until adolescence, reaching adult levels around age 15 (Best & Miller, 2010). 
A single strongly supported theoretical perspective is necessary to evaluate the measurement of 
executive abilities through research; however, what is more important lies within the similarities 
between conceptualizations of EF. Although we support the unity and diversity framework of 
EF, it is clear that all conceptualizations of EF share in common the idea that EF involves the 
ability to self-regulate thoughts and behaviours towards a goal.  
2. Emotion Regulation  
Another self-regulatory ability, emotion regulation (ER), has been a topic of increasing interest 
over the past 20 years. Over this time, various conceptualizations of what ER entails have been 
put forth. Typically these models share the idea that ER involves the active management of 
emotions in pursuit of an emotional goal (Gross, 1998b; Koole, 2009; Parkinson & Totterdell, 
1999; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002; Thayer Newman & McClain, 1994; Thompson, 1994; 
Thompson, 2011). In this way, ER is generally similar to EF in the sense that it requires an 
individual to monitor internal and external information, and apply changes towards a desired 
goal. Also like EF, ER has several similar models defining what it entails. Of note, this review 
aims to examine the construct of ER, which is thought to be somewhat different from other 
forms of affect regulation, including mood regulation which refers to self-regulation of mood 
states, and coping which focuses on the reduction of stress. These latter constructs are not 
included in the review.  
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2.1 Models of ER  
Affect regulation 
A broad conceptualization of affect regulation which encompasses emotion regulation, coping, 
and mood regulation has been put forth by Parkinson and Totterdell (1999) who suggest that 
there are two overarching types of affect regulation. The first, automatic refers to over-learnt 
affect regulation strategies that occur outside of conscious awareness, but still work towards 
changing a felt emotion. This type of affect regulation is thought to be well engrained and is 
primarily utilized to help maintain emotional homeostasis (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). 
Conversely, controlled affect regulation is suggested to involve deliberate manipulation of mood 
states through some regulation strategy which is implemented, monitored and terminated based 
on a desired affective state (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). This latter form of affect regulation is 
more similar to what is focused upon in articles which define mood regulation, emotion 
regulation and coping (Gross, 1998b; Skinner, Edge, Altman & Sherwood, 2003; Thayer et al., 
1994). Accordingly, the scope of this paper will include a focus on controlled affect regulation. 
Parkinson and Totterdell’s (1999) taxonomy of affect regulation strategies identified a broad 
spectrum of ER strategies. Their model was based on Thayer and colleagues’ (1994) 
conceptualization, but aimed to overcome some of the limitations identified in Thayer et al.’s 
model (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). Primarily, the authors wanted to include an exhaustive list 
of affect regulation strategies that would be derived through a theoretical perspective of affect 
regulation. Facets of affect regulation strategies could then be tested through confirmatory factor 
analysis.  
14 
 
Using this perspective, the authors created an extensive list of affect regulation strategies 
consisting of 162 strategies with six higher-level distinctions (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). The 
higher-level distinctions postulated consisted of behavioural versus cognitive implementation 
mediums, diversion versus addressing strategies, active versus passive diversion from the 
troubling thought or feeling, direct versus indirect benefits provided by the strategy, active 
versus passive addressing of the thought or feeling, and situation-directed versus affect-directed 
strategies for addressing mood state (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). These higher-level 
distinctions were further broken down into sub-clusters, such as distraction, relaxation/pleasure 
oriented, reappraisal, and social support. 
When these strategies were sorted by participants it was found that the cognitive/behavioural and 
address/diversion distinctions were rated highly similar to the structure proposed by the 
researchers (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). Additionally, sub-clusters of affect recognition also 
had some degree of convergence with the model proposed by the authors. According to ratings 
from participants there was no evidence of situated- or affect-directed strategies, or active versus 
passive addressing, or diversion of the thoughts or feelings. However, there was some 
differentiation within the diversion category. The new distinction that was created within this 
factor regarded avoidance of versus distraction from negative mood states (Parkinson & 
Totterdell, 1999). 
Parkinson and Totterdell’s (1999) taxonomy of affect regulation provides a fairly comprehensive 
assessment of regulation strategies based both on a theoretical conceptualization of affect 
regulation and empirical evidence. Although their categorization does not provide information 
about the effectiveness of these strategies to regulate emotions, it offers a broader understanding 
of commonly used affect regulation strategies. 
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A meta-analysis by Augustine and Hemenover (2009) has attempted to provide some 
understanding of the effectiveness of various affect regulation strategies. Through their research 
they identify over 300 known ER strategies, which they categorized using Parkinson and 
Totterdell’s (1999) taxonomy (as cited in Augustine & Hemenover, 2009, p. 1182).  This 
taxonomy includes ER strategies that fit into categories such as, distraction, rumination, 
avoidance, suppression, reappraisal, catharsis and behavioural strategies. Studies examined 
found that cognitive reappraisal and distraction were the most effective ER strategies, whereas 
catharsis and expressive suppression were found to be ineffective (Augustine & Hemenover, 
2009). This is consistent with work by Gross and John (2003) which has found that cognitive 
reappraisal has been associated with positive psychological outcomes, whereas expressive 
suppression has been linked with more negative outcomes. 
Emotion regulation 
A model of affect regulation that focuses upon the mechanisms of emotional change has been 
presented by Gross’ (1998b) process model of ER. Herein, ER is defined as actively changing 
one’s emotional experience towards an emotional goal (Gross, 1998b; Gross, 2015). This goal 
may refer to increasing, or decreasing the intensity of positive, or negative emotions and may be 
implemented either before, or after an emotion is felt. While it may seem counter-intuitive for 
individuals to need to decrease the intensity of positive emotions, there are situations where this 
would be useful based on cultural norms, such as suppressing feelings of happiness at a funeral 
(Gross, 2015).  
Importantly, Gross (2015) makes a distinction between ER and conceptualizations of mood 
regulation and coping, such as those presented by Parkinson and Totterdell (1999), Thayer et al. 
(1994), and Skinner and colleagues (2003). According to Gross, these three regulatory processes 
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are all categorized under the spectrum of affect regulation. Gross suggests that the activation of a 
goal to influence the magnitude of a felt emotion over time is what separates ER apart from 
mood regulation and coping. Although coping is similar to ER, Gross recognizes that coping 
focuses on the reduction of stress over longer periods of time. Similarly, mood regulation has 
significant overlap with ER, although moods are suggested by Gross (2015) to be more 
cognitively controlled and pervasive than emotions. Accordingly, mood regulation shares less 
with behavioural ER strategies, and more with cognitive ones. Both of these subtypes of ER are 
identified by Gross’ (1998b) process model of ER and are further explained below. 
According to Gross’ (1998b) process model of emotion regulation, ER strategies deployed prior 
to feeling an emotion are referred to as antecedent-focused ER strategies, while those enacted 
after a felt emotion are referred to as response-focused ER strategies. Gross’ process of ER 
consists of five components: (1) the selection of a situation; (2) the modification of problematic 
situations; (3) attentional deployment; (4) cognitive change; and (5) response modulation. The 
first four components lend themselves to antecedent-focused ER, while the fifth component is 
specific to response-focused ER (Gross, 1998b). Additionally, Gross (2015) identifies that 
emotions change from moment to moment and that we can have several different appraisals and 
responses to any given situation. The cyclical nature of emotional appraisal and regulation 
suggests that certain antecedent-focused ER strategies, such as cognitive change may not always 
be strictly antecedent and may at times be better considered as response-focused. 
An example of an antecedent ER strategy at the level of selection of a situation would be to 
avoid going to a horror film, so that you do feel scared. Using the example of a horror film 
regarding the modification of problematic situations might involve bringing a friend with you for 
social support. A similar example, occurring at the attentional deployment level, would be 
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averting your gaze just prior to seeing something terrifying in the film to reduce the negative 
feelings that you might have felt if you had continued to look at the screen. Cognitive change 
could entail you telling yourself that the film is not real, while response modulation might 
involve you not grimacing, or jumping out of your seat when something scary occurs. Selection 
of a situation, modification of the situation, attentional deployment, and response modulation are 
primarily ER strategies at the behavioural level. Conversely, as the name implies, cognitive 
change involves strategies at the cognitive level.  
Through the process model described above, Gross and colleagues have often focused on two ER 
strategies, cognitive reappraisal, and expressive suppression. The reason for focusing on these 
two specific strategies was three-fold: to select commonly used strategies of ER, to identify 
strategies that could be manipulated and defined through individual differences, and to focus on 
the distinction between antecedent and response-focused ER strategies (Gross & John, 2003). 
Cognitive reappraisal is an example of cognitive change, while expressive suppression is an 
example of response modulation. The focus of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), 
created by Gross and John (2003) was based on these two strategies. Accordingly, much of the 
research following its creation has also focused on understanding the use of these two ER 
strategies. Through this research, expressive suppression has been linked to several negative 
outcomes such as experience of more negative emotions, less positive emotions, poorer 
interpersonal functioning and greater psychological distress. Conversely, cognitive reappraisal 
has been linked to increased experience of positive emotions, reduced experience of negative 
emotions, better interpersonal functioning and improved well-being (Gross & John, 2003). 
A meta-analysis by Webb and colleagues (Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012) also examined the 
effectiveness of ER strategies at each level of the process model proposed by James Gross 
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(1998b). Comparisons were analyzed at the level of attentional deployment, cognitive change, 
and response modulation (Webb et al., 2012). At the level of attentional deployment, strategies 
were either focused on distraction from, or concentration on the emotional experience. Regarding 
cognitive change, strategies were separated based on whether participants were instructed to 
reappraise the emotional stimulus, the emotional response, or to reappraise via perspective 
taking. Finally, distinctions were made at the level of response modulation based on whether the 
participants suppressed the expression, experience, or the thoughts associated with the emotion 
(Webb et al., 2012). Across studies, various emotional outcomes were measured. These involved 
experiential outcomes, which were typically measured through self-report, physiological 
outcomes, such as heart rate or EEG, and behavioural outcomes, typically measured through 
observer report of emotional expression (Webb et al., 2012). Overall, the authors found that 
cognitive change demonstrated a small to moderate effect size on emotional outcomes and was 
found to be significantly more effective on these outcomes than response modulation and 
attentional deployment. Additionally, response modulation was observed to have a small positive 
effect size on emotional outcomes and was significantly better than attentional deployment on 
these outcomes. Interestingly, when analysing differences within attentional deployment 
strategies, the authors found that distraction presented a small positive effect size, whereas 
concentration demonstrated a negative effect size to the same magnitude (Webb et al., 2012). 
This suggests that at the level of attentional deployment distraction may be an effective ER 
strategy, while concentration may represent an ineffective strategy. Regarding the effectiveness 
of response modulation, there was significant variability across different ER strategies within 
this category. Specifically, suppression of emotional expression was the only response 
modulation strategy that provided a small to moderate positive effect size. However, suppression 
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of emotional experience and thoughts produced effect sizes close to zero. Thus it is unlikely that 
suppression of the emotion is an effective ER strategy. Moreover, this effect was almost entirely 
driven by behavioural measures and there were almost no effects regarding self-report and 
physiological measures (Webb et al., 2012). This is consistent with research by Gross and John 
(2003) and Augustine and Hemenover (2009) which identifies expressive suppression as an 
ineffective ER strategy. Regarding cognitive change, all forms of reappraisal presented small to 
moderate positive effect sizes; however, reappraisal through perspective taking was significantly 
more effective than reappraisal of the emotional response. This is also consistent with recent 
research categorizing cognitive reappraisal as an effective ER strategy (Augustine & Hemenover, 
2009; Gross & John, 2003). 
Several models of affect regulation have been developed over the past 20 years. Generally, ER is 
considered to be both similar to and different from mood regulation and coping. However, all of 
these models have considered affect regulation to relate to changing felt emotions towards some 
emotional goal whether it be long-term or more immediate. Overall, James Gross’ (1998b) 
process model of ER has gained the most traction in the literature, and a plethora of research has 
been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of expressive suppression and cognitive 
reappraisal in the regulation of emotions. Accordingly, we take the perspective of this model 
when defining emotion regulation.  
2.2 Development of ER and related faculties 
Now that we have an understanding of what ER is, it is important that we consider how ER 
processes develop, and how they are distinguished from other emotional processes. A review 
article by Thompson (2011) makes sense of emotional development from a systems perspective. 
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From this perspective influences from many facets of emotional processing, such as sensory, 
socio-cultural, cognitive and environmental effects, are considered (Thompson, 2011). 
In infancy, regulation of emotions consists of expressing distress to gain the attention of one’s 
parents (Thompson, 2011). More intermediate ER strategies, coinciding with the development of 
theory of mind, might include becoming overtly frustrated with another child for blocking your 
goal (Thompson, 2011). These earlier ER strategies are focused primarily on regulating emotions 
through external sources. More internal regulation strategies begin to develop when children start 
to understand culturally acceptable norms for expressing and experiencing emotions (Thompson, 
2011). For example, children in western cultures may count to ten to avoid physically attacking 
another child for making fun of them, as this is typically not considered an appropriate response. 
Appraisals of emotions and associated regulation of these emotions becomes increasingly 
influenced by socio-cultural norms, and environmental experiences. Regulation of emotions also 
becomes more considerate of long-term emotional goals as children develop the ability to plan 
and monitor their goals over a longer period of time (Thompson, 2011). 
According to Thompson (2011), early regulation strategies develop through the acquisition of 
more acute attentional control, which may influence emotional appraisals. Thus, infants may 
more effectively satisfy internal emotional goals, such as distress caused by hunger, through 
recognizing that their caregiver is present, and through crying to get their attention. Once a 
cursory understanding of language has been achieved, Thompson (2011) suggests that ER 
develops primarily as a result of internal schemata created through parent-child interactions. 
These interactions communicate expectations of appropriate expression and experience of 
emotions. Early interactions between the child and parents are typically the first of their kind and 
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set the stage for beliefs about emotions, emotional expression and its consequences, and others’ 
representation of emotions (Thompson, 2011). 
The influence of the child-parent interaction on normative ER development is supported by a 
review by Southam-Gerow and Kendall (2002). This review points out that these interactions are 
affected by childhood temperament, attachment, and parenting style. Importantly, both 
developmental reviews highlight the importance of the development of healthy ER strategies for 
later interpersonal and intrapersonal functioning (Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002; Thompson, 
2011). Moreover, Thompson (2011) identifies that negative early parent-child interactions 
quickly foster regulation strategies that may be adaptive given the child’s environment and may 
serve the purpose of meeting their short-term emotional goals; however, these strategies may 
become detrimental long-term strategies and may also be ineffective when generalized to other 
environments or situations. It can be very difficult for these strategies to be modified or 
overridden once they have been developed, which can then lead to difficulties with mental health 
and socio-emotional aptitude (Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002).  
Another influence identified as an important factor in the development of ER is emotional 
understanding (Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002). According to Southam-Gerow and Kendall 
(2002) emotional understanding involves knowledge about their own and others’ emotions 
including causes of, and cues for emotions, as well as methods of communicating emotions 
through expression, and coping with their own emotions. These methods of expressing and 
coping with emotions refer not to the active management of emotions, but rather the knowledge 
of the ability that emotions can be managed (Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002). Considering 
that ER involves the active management of emotions, it is necessary for an individual to be able 
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to identify the emotion to be regulated, and as such emotional understanding is a fundamental 
aspect of ER. 
Another aspect of emotion that may affect the development of ER has been referred to as 
emotional sensitivity or reactivity. Koole (2009) refers to emotional reactivity as emotional 
information that has not had a chance to be cognitively processed. Thus sensitivity refers to 
emotional information that has not yet been controlled or manipulated by the individual (Koole, 
2009). As identified by Davidson (1998), it is often not clear where an emotion ends and 
regulation begins (As cited in Koole, 2009, p. 8). Of course, this could be considered as a failure 
to suppress this emotional information. However, an individual must be able to both identify that 
they are having an emotion, and be able to identify which emotion they are having, in order to 
effectively regulate that emotion (Koole, 2009; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002). According to 
Koole, this primary emotional response has been referred to as emotional sensitivity and it is 
quickly followed by a secondary emotional response which is the regulation of the primary 
emotional reaction. Regarding emotional sensitivity, individuals may differ in the intensity of 
their primary emotional response, which may have implications for the development of adaptive 
ER strategies and the ability to effectively down-regulate more intense emotions.  
A developmental study by Silvers and colleagues (Silvers, McRae, Gabrieli, Gross, Remy & 
Ochsner, 2012) examined differences in both regulation and reactivity in children, adolescents 
and young adults aged 10-22. They found that ER success, operationalized by successful 
cognitive reappraisal of an emotion, increased significantly until 16 years-of-age, whereas there 
was no significant relationship between emotional reactivity and age. Interestingly, the 
developmental trajectory of regulation success is similar to the developmental course of 
executive functions. Specifically, these findings suggest cognitive reappraisal success, working 
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memory and shifting ability all continue to develop into mid-adolescence (Huizinga et al., 2006; 
Lehto et al., 2003; Silvers et al., 2012).  
Additionally, the finding that reactivity does not demonstrate a linear relationship with age 
suggests that reactivity has either fully developed by 10 years-of-age, or that it is relatively stable 
from birth. Indeed, longitudinal research from infancy to four years had demonstrated that 
reactivity is fairly robust and may be present and stable from birth (Ursache, Blair, Stifter & 
Voegtline, 2013). This latter study also suggests that there is a relationship between ER success 
and reactivity, which is mediated by positive parent-child interactions. As identified by Southam-
Gerow and Kendall (2002), and Thompson (2012) the parent-child relationship is vital to the 
development of healthy ER. Research by Ursache and colleagues suggests that reactivity may 
also play an important role in the acquisition of adaptive ER strategies. It is unclear from the 
Silvers and colleagues (2012) study whether or not reactivity influences the ability to 
successfully reappraise an emotion. Although no comparisons were reported regarding the 
association of these two concepts in the Silvers study, there is some indication, through more 
recent research, that reactivity is a relatively stable trait. Accordingly, further research is 
necessary to determine the nature of the relationship between ER and emotional reactivity. 
Nonetheless, the distinction between reactivity and regulation does have some supporting 
research (Koole, 2009, Ursache et al., 2013). Reactivity involves a primary emotional response 
and the realization that an individual is having an emotion, which is followed by regulation, a 
secondary emotional response involving some form of cognitive control of that emotion to either 
increase or decrease its valence (Koole, 2009). It is thought that reactivity and regulation 
interact, and that the development of regulation may be influenced by reactivity although very 
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few studies have carefully examined this interaction (Koole, 2009; Silvers et al., 2012; Ursache 
et al., 2013). 
3. Interplay of EF and ER 
ER and EF both involve the ability to regulate one’s thoughts/emotions/behaviours in the pursuit 
of a goal. Although conceptual similarities between EF and ER exist, there is a dearth of research 
examining how these constructs may be associated.  Nonetheless, there are a considerable 
amount of studies examining the neuroanatomical networks of EF and ER independently, and 
these studies have observed some overlap in function between these two processes. Additionally, 
a few research studies have examined the relationship between EF and ER directly using 
behavioural measures and found some association between EF and ER. Furthermore, studies 
examining dysfunctional EF and ER have found other common correlates, such as mental health 
concerns. These studies and their contribution to the literature will be described in the following 
sections. 
3.1 Neuroanatomical substrates of EF and ER 
EF and ER are both supported by neuroanatomical networks in which pre-frontal brain regions 
play an important role. Regarding neuroanatomical networks of ER, an fMRI study by Ochsner 
and colleagues (2002) identified increased activation of left lateralized frontal areas involved in 
active reappraisal of negative emotions. Specifically, they reported increased activation of the 
left lateralized medial orbitofrontal cortex, ventro- and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, and the 
ACC, as well as decreases in amygdala activation during reappraisal of negative emotions. A 
more recent review paper by Ochsner and Gross (2005) presents additional evidence supporting 
the involvement of these frontal brain regions in the use of emotion regulation strategies.  
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When considering neuroanatomical networks of EF, a meta-analysis of fMRI studies examining 
neural activity during various EF tasks revealed findings similar to that of ER research (Houde et 
al., 2010). Overall, studies demonstrated that both children and adolescents utilized bilateral 
frontal areas including the dorsolateral and inferior prefrontal cortices, and the insular cortex. 
Houde and colleagues (2010) did identify a minor difference between adolescents and children, 
which was that insular activation shifted from being left lateralized in childhood to right 
lateralized in adolescence. Nonetheless, the areas involved during EF tasks seem to remain 
largely analogous throughout development. 
In addition to the aforementioned areas being involved in EF, a review paper by Bellebaum and 
Daum (2007) has identified the cerebellum as an area of importance with regard to working 
memory specifically. Although the involvement of the cerebellum seems to be less important 
than the PFC for carrying out executive tasks, it should not be overlooked when considering 
neural networks of EF. Moreover, it should be noted that no known research study has found a 
relationship between emotion regulation and cerebellar activity. 
Overall, EF and ER neural networks seem to share common areas including the dorso- and 
ventro-lateral PFC and the ACC. Emotion regulation seems to involve orbitofrontal areas more 
so than EF. Conversely, EF seems to involve the cerebellum and parietal areas to a greater 
degree than ER. Compared to other areas of the brain, these frontal areas develop slowly and are 
typically not fully matured until the 2nd decade of life. Given that ER and EF share these 
common neural substrates, it is not surprising that the development of internally controlled ER 
and effective EF lag behind the development of other abilities, such as visual and motor skills. 
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3.2 Behavioural studies of EF and ER 
A developmental study by Carlson and Wang (2007) examined similarities between inhibitory 
control and emotion regulation. They did so through behavioural and parent-report measures that 
looked primarily at inhibition and expressive suppression in a sample of 4- and 5-year-olds. The 
researchers found that a composite of emotion regulation, consisting of two expressive 
suppression tasks and an emotional understanding task, and a composite of inhibitory control, 
consisting of three inhibitory tasks were significantly positively correlated with each other, and 
that all behavioural measures loaded onto a single factor which accounted for 58% of the 
variance. Furthermore, parent-report measures of both emotion regulation and inhibitory control 
were significantly correlated with each other and with behavioural composites of these constructs 
(Carlson & Wang, 2007).  Interestingly, the authors found effects of both gender and age. The 
aforementioned effects were only present for females and when collapsed across gender and only 
remained significant for 4-year-olds (Carlson & Wang, 2007). One explanation for this pattern of 
results could be that the between-groups factors had relatively small n’s and as such did not 
reach significance based on this limitation, although effect sizes of these groups were still below 
0.1 (Carlson & Wang, 2007). Overall, these results suggest some promising relationships 
between expressive suppression and inhibitory control in a developing population. It is unclear 
whether aspects of ER and EF overlap in their development, such that some overarching self-
regulatory process may be driving the two, or whether ER plays a primary role in the 
development of EF, or vice-versa (Carlson & Wang, 2007). Given the modest effect sizes found, 
it is assumed that these two processes are separable self-regulatory abilities. Longitudinal 
research determining the developmental trajectory of these functions would help define the 
directionality of these relationships. 
27 
 
More recently, longitudinal research examining the interplay of EF and ER has been carried out 
by Ursache and colleagues (Ursache, Blair, Stifter & Voegtline, 2013). These researchers 
assessed ER and emotional reactivity in infancy, and evaluated EF at age four. They exposed 
infants to fear evoking stimuli while they were with their parents, and coded the infants’ facial 
expressions from moment to moment in order to assess their reactivity and ability to regulate 
their emotions. This was done at 7-, 15-, and 24-months of age. Children were given a battery of 
six behavioural measures assessing executive functioning at 48-months of age. Three of the 
measures assessed inhibition, two measured working memory and one assessed shifting ability 
(Ursache et al., 2013). Results indicated that neither regulation nor reactivity at any of the three 
time-points predicted EF at 48 months; however, there was a significant regulation by reactivity 
interaction at 15 months (Ursache et al., 2013). Further analysis indicated that high reactivity and 
more positive regulation abilities predicted higher levels of EF at 48 months, while high 
reactivity and poorer regulation abilities produced poorer executive abilities at 48 months. This 
suggests that the relationship between EF and early ER is moderated by reactivity. Furthermore, 
the researchers found that positive parenting practices mediated the effect of reactivity on EF, 
such that children who were more reactive and demonstrated higher executive abilities also had 
parents who offered more support to their child during the fear evoking situations (Ursache et al., 
2013). The authors suggest that this external regulation of emotions through the parents may lead 
to lower physiological arousal, which may subsequently free up cognitive resources conducive to 
fostering positive executive abilities (Ursache et al., 2013). Additionally, this external regulation 
may also allow for similar mechanisms to promote the development of adaptive self-regulated 
ER abilities. Although the researchers’ analyses only found this pattern of results at 15-months 
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of age, it still provides some empirical evidence of a complex relationship between ER and EF at 
an early stage of development. 
The prior studies have specifically examined the relationship of EF and ER in young children 
and infants. It has been established that at these young ages both of these abilities are still 
undergoing changes and that they do not fully mature until later in development (Best & Miller, 
2010; Huzinga et al., 2006; Koole, 2009; Lehto et al., 2003; Silvers et al., 2012; Southam-Gerow 
& Kendall, 2002; Thompson, 2011; Van der Ven, 2012). A study by Bridgett and colleagues 
(Bridgett, Oddi, Laake, Murdock & Bachmann, 2013) assessed whether these constructs were 
associated with each other in a sample of adults. This was done through the use of several 
behavioural measures to assess executive abilities and self-report questionnaires to measure the 
expression and experience of negative affect. Overall, the researchers found that inhibition was 
specifically related to the expression of negative affect, but not the experience of negative affect, 
while working memory was related to the experience of negative affect, but not the expression of 
negative affect (Bridgett et al., 2013). The authors suggest that this indicates that inhibition may 
be related to regulation of the overt expression of emotions similar to the ER strategy of 
expressive suppression. These findings would be consistent with Carlson and Wang’s (2007) 
findings in young children. Additionally, Bridgett and colleagues propose that working memory 
may be related to the regulatory abilities that include altering the experience of emotions, such as 
cognitive reappraisal (Bridgett et al., 2013). Unfortunately, the researchers did not overtly 
measure whether these findings were related to increased use of expressive suppression or 
cognitive reappraisal through well-validated measures such as the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). 
Accordingly, it is impossible to know whether this hypothesis would be supported empirically. 
Nonetheless, this research provides some foundation for future research to build upon. 
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Other studies have looked at the relationship between EF and ER in samples of neurologically 
abnormal individuals. A study by Gyurak and colleagues (Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller & 
Levenson, 2012) assessed abilities to down- and up-regulate both positive and negative emotions 
while watching a movie clip. Their sample included older adults with and without a diagnosis of 
a neurodegenerative disorder. Heart rate was recorded during the ER task. The researchers 
evaluated the participants EF abilities through four tasks. A single task was used to examine 
inhibition, working memory, switching and verbal fluency (Gyurak et al., 2012). Results 
indicated that ER ability was significantly related to measures of verbal fluency, but not to other 
measures of EF. The researchers propose that verbal fluency requires more complex planning 
and monitoring abilities than the other executive abilities measured, and accordingly may 
therefore be used more when regulating one’s emotions (Gyurak et al., 2012). Interestingly, 
comparisons between those with and without a neurodegenerative disorder were not carried out 
in this study. Rather, participants with a neurodegenerative disorder were included to provide a 
wide range of executive function capabilities (Gyurak et al., 2012). However, the degree to 
which the findings were driven by the abnormal individuals was not reported. Accordingly, this 
study provides some evidence that verbal fluency is related to successful up- and down-
regulation of emotions across a spectrum of older adults. Unfortunately, these findings did not 
generalize to any of the core EF constructs. 
Another study conducted by Phillips and colleagues (Phillips, Henry, Nouzova, Cooper, Radlak 
& Summers, 2014) compared the relationship of EF and ER between a group of individuals with 
a diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and healthy controls. The researchers evaluated ER, 
anxiety and depressive symptoms and quality of life through self-report questionnaires. 
Executive abilities, specifically sustained attention ability and verbal fluency, were measured 
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using behavioural tasks (Phillips et al., 2014). Overall, they found that individuals with a 
diagnosis of MS scored significantly worse on all measures, and that within this group, emotion 
regulation ability was significantly related to verbal fluency (Phillips et al., 2014). This provides 
further evidence that ER is related to verbal fluency and supports research findings by Gyurak 
and colleagues (2012), who found similar results in a mixed sample of older adults with and 
without a neurodegenerative disorder. 
Across the aforementioned studies there is some indication that aspects of EF and ER share some 
commonality. Unfortunately, the most compelling evidence comes from research with young 
children, and as mentioned, both ER and EF are not fully developed at these times (Huizinga et 
al., 2006; Lehto et al., 2003; Van der Ven et al., 2013). Accordingly, it is difficult to draw much 
from these studies. The other area where there is decent empirical data supporting a connection 
between ER and EF is in individuals who have a diagnosis of a neurological disorder (Gyurak et 
al., 2012; Phillips et al., 2014). Unfortunately, neither of these studies found a connection 
between ER, inhibition, working memory, or shifting. Nonetheless, the finding that ER and 
measures of verbal fluency are associated is still interesting. However, it does not provide 
conclusive evidence that EF and ER are indeed related. The study by Bridgett and colleagues 
(2013) does offer some hope in providing an indication that these concepts are related in 
typically developing young adults, although their operationalization of ER was inadequate to 
provide any confirmation of the relationship between ER and EF. Taken together, it is clear that 
these findings are quite inconclusive and future research is needed to determine whether an 
association between ER and EF truly exists. 
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3.3 EF, ER and mental health 
In addition to the previous two studies identifying difficulties with EF and ER in atypical 
populations, several studies have considered difficulties with EF and ER in the development and 
maintenance of various mental health concerns. Dysfunctional EF has been commonly linked to 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Barkley, 1997; Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010), 
major depressive disorder (MDD; Ikeda, Shiozaki, Ikeda, Suzuki & Hirayasu, 2013; Wingo, 
Kalkut, Tuminello, Asconape & Han, 2013), anorexia nervosa (Gillberg, Billstedt, Wentz, 
Anckarsater, Rastam & Gillberg, 2010), elevated state and trait anxiety (Visu-Petra, Miclea & 
Visu-Petra, 2013) and substance abuse (Wilens et al., 2011). Similarly, difficulty regulating  
one’s emotions has been associated with ADHD (Melnick & Hinshaw, 2000), oppositional 
defiant disorder (ODD; Fraire & Ollendick, 2011) MDD (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Campbell-Sills, Simmons, Lovero, Rochlin Paulus & Stein, 
2011), substance abuse, specific phobias, bipolar disorder (Gruber, Eidelman & Harvey, 2008) 
eating disorders, borderline personality disorder (Svaldi, Griepenstroh, Tuschen-Caffier & 
Ehring, 2012), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Fairholme, Nosen, Nillni, Schumacher, 
Tull & Coffey, 2013). This provides strong evidence that difficulties with both EF and ER are 
often related to mental health problems, and that there is a great deal of overlap in the 
presentation of mental health difficulties. It is, however, unclear as to whether these mental 
health issues are caused by difficulties with EF and ER, or whether these mental health issues 
may cause difficulties with EF and ER. Nonetheless, dysfunctional EF and ER seem to both co-
occur with a wide variety of mental health concerns. 
Through the aforementioned research, it is clear that EF and ER share common neural correlates, 
and that they are implicated in similar types of mental health difficulties. Additionally, a few 
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behavioural studies have demonstrated some direct association between aspects of EF and ER. 
However, very few research studies have looked at this association and it is unclear exactly how 
these processes are similar, and whether or not they are related throughout development and into 
adulthood. Future research should aim to capture the precise nature of the interaction between 
these two processes in a well-controlled study. 
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Introduction 
In the current study we explore how executive functions (EF) and emotion regulation (ER) are 
related. Both EF and ER are self-regulatory abilities which have been linked to common mental 
health outcomes; however, few research studies have looked at the direct relationship or 
considered common underlying factors that may influence this relationship. The current study 
examined the relationships between ER strategy use, EFs, and their joint and independent effects 
on the experience of emotions and psychological distress. Additionally, emotional reactivity was 
evaluated as a moderator of the relationship between EF, ER and the experience of emotions and 
psychological distress. 
Executive functions 
Executive functions (EF) are typically viewed as processes used to self-regulate one’s thoughts 
and behaviours towards a goal (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). According to Miyake and colleagues’ 
(2000) unity and diversity framework, EF is composed of a set of interrelated, but separable 
constructs that aid individuals in the effortful self-regulation of their thoughts and actions 
towards a specific goal. The three major factors that Miyake and colleagues (2000) have focused 
on are inhibition of prepotent responses, updating and monitoring of working memory 
representations, and shifting between task demands. Inhibition refers to the deliberate process of 
stopping oneself from performing a prepotent response. Updating includes actively updating, 
monitoring and coding task-relevant information. Shifting is the ability to switch attention 
between tasks or mental sets, which requires individuals to disengage from an irrelevant task or 
mental set in order to engage in a relevant task or mental set. These three executive skills were 
focused on because they have been well studied, are viewed as being more central to the 
executive construct, and relatedly, are thought to be required for more complex forms of EF 
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(Miyake et al., 2000). Confirmatory factor analysis by Miyake and colleagues has largely 
supported this conceptualization of EF, and although other models of EF have been proposed 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Nigg, 2000; Munakata, Snyder and Chatam, 2012; Norman & 
Shallice, 1974; Posner & Boies, 1971; Zelazo & Frye 1998), Miyake et al.’s EF structure has 
gained the most support in the literature. Therefore, we have adopted the unity and diversity 
framework of EF when conceptualizing EF. 
Emotion regulation 
Another self-regulatory ability, emotion regulation (ER), has been a topic of increasing interest 
over the past 20 years. Over this time, various conceptualizations of what ER entails have been 
put forth. Typically these models share the idea that ER involves the active management of 
emotions in pursuit of an emotional goal (Gross, 1998b; Koole, 2009; Parkinson & Totterdell, 
1999; Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002; Thayer Newman & McClain, 1994; Thompson, 1994; 
Thompson, 2011). In this way, ER is generally similar to EF in the sense that it requires an 
individual to monitor internal and external information, and apply changes towards a desired 
goal. Also like EF, ER has several similar models defining what it entails. 
A model of affect regulation that focuses upon the mechanisms of emotional change has been 
presented by Gross’ (1998b) process model of ER. Herein, ER is defined as actively changing 
one’s emotional experience towards an emotional goal (Gross, 1998b; Gross, 2015). This goal 
may refer to increasing, or decreasing the intensity of positive, or negative emotions and may be 
implemented either before, or after an emotion is felt. While it may seem counter-intuitive for 
individuals to need to decrease the intensity of positive emotions, there are situations where this 
would be useful based on cultural norms, such as suppressing feelings of happiness at a funeral 
(Gross, 2015).  
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According to Gross’ (1998b) process model of emotion regulation, ER strategies deployed prior 
to feeling an emotion are referred to as antecedent-focused ER strategies, while those enacted 
after a felt emotion are referred to as response-focused ER strategies. Gross’ process of ER 
consists of five components: (1) the selection of a situation; (2) the modification of problematic 
situations; (3) attentional deployment; (4) cognitive change; and (5) response modulation. The 
first four components lend themselves to antecedent-focused ER, while the fifth component is 
specific to response-focused ER (Gross, 1998b). Additionally, Gross (2015) identifies that 
emotions change from moment to moment and that we can have several different appraisals and 
responses to any given situation. The cyclical nature of emotional appraisal and regulation 
suggests that certain antecedent-focused ER strategies, such as cognitive change may not always 
be strictly antecedent and may at times be better considered as response-focused. 
Through the process model described above, Gross and colleagues have often focused on two ER 
strategies, cognitive reappraisal, and expressive suppression. The reason for focusing on these 
two specific strategies was three-fold: to select commonly used strategies of ER, to identify 
strategies that could be manipulated and defined through individual differences, and to focus on 
the distinction between antecedent and response-focused ER strategies (Gross & John, 2003). 
Cognitive reappraisal is an exemplar strategy of an antecedent ER strategy at the level of 
cognitive change. An example of cognitive reappraisal could entail you telling yourself that the 
events portrayed in a horror film are not real. Conversely, expressive suppression is an example 
of a response-focused ER strategy at the level of response modulation. An example of expressive 
suppression might involve you not grimacing, or jumping out of your seat when something scary 
occurs. Response modulation is an ER strategy utilized at the behavioural level, while as the 
name implies, cognitive reappraisal involves strategies deployed at the cognitive level.  
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Similar to conceptualizations of EF, several models of ER have been proposed (Koole, 2009; 
Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer Newman & McClain, 1994). However, James Gross’ 
(1998b) process model of ER has gained the most traction in the literature, and a plethora of 
research has been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of expressive suppression and 
cognitive reappraisal in the regulation of emotions. Accordingly, we take the perspective of this 
model when defining emotion regulation.  
Emotional reactivity 
An aspect of emotion that may affect the ability to successfully enact various ER strategies has 
been referred to as emotional reactivity. Koole (2009) refers to emotional reactivity as emotional 
information that has not had a chance to be cognitively processed. Thus reactivity refers to 
emotional information that has not yet been controlled or manipulated by the individual (Koole, 
2009). As identified by Davidson (1998), it is often not clear where an emotion ends and 
regulation begins (As cited in Koole, 2009, p. 8). According to Koole, this primary emotional 
response has been referred to as emotional reactivity and it is quickly followed by a secondary 
emotional response which is the regulation of the primary emotional reaction. Regarding 
emotional reactivity, individuals may differ in the intensity of their primary emotional response, 
which may have implications for the successful use of adaptive ER strategies and the ability to 
effectively down-regulate more intense emotions.  
EF, ER and psychological distress 
ER and EF both involve the ability to regulate one’s thoughts/emotions/behaviours in the pursuit 
of a goal. Although conceptual similarities between EF and ER exist, there is a dearth of research 
examining how these constructs may be associated. Nonetheless, a few research studies have 
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examined the relationship between EF and ER directly using behavioural measures and found 
some association between EF and ER. Furthermore, studies examining dysfunctional EF and ER 
have found other common correlates, such as mental health concerns. The following section 
reviews these studies and their contribution to the literature.  
A developmental study by Carlson and Wang (2007) examined similarities between inhibitory 
control and emotion regulation. They did so through behavioural and parent-report measures that 
looked primarily at inhibition and expressive suppression in a sample of 4- and 5-year-olds. The 
researchers found that a composite of emotion regulation, consisting of two expressive 
suppression tasks and an emotional understanding task, and a composite of inhibitory control, 
consisting of three inhibitory tasks were significantly positively correlated with each other, and 
that all behavioural measures loaded onto a single factor which accounted for 58% of the 
variance. Furthermore, parent-report measures of both emotion regulation and inhibitory control 
were significantly correlated with each other and with behavioural composites of these constructs 
(Carlson & Wang, 2007). Overall, these results suggest some promising relationships between 
expressive suppression and inhibitory control in a developing population. It is unclear whether 
these effects would generalize to more mature samples. 
More recently, longitudinal research examining the interplay of EF and ER has been carried out 
by Ursache and colleagues (Ursache, Blair, Stifter & Voegtline, 2013). These researchers 
assessed ER and emotional reactivity in infancy, and then evaluated EF at age four. They 
exposed infants to fear evoking stimuli while they were with their parents, and coded the infants’ 
facial expressions from moment to moment in order to assess their reactivity and ability to 
regulate their emotions. This was done at 7-, 15-, and 24-months of age. Children were given a 
battery of six behavioural measures assessing executive functioning at 48-months of age. Three 
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of the measures assessed inhibition, two measured working memory and one assessed shifting 
ability (Ursache et al., 2013). Results indicated that neither regulation nor reactivity at any of the 
three time-points predicted EF at 48 months; however, there was a significant regulation by 
reactivity interaction at 15 months (Ursache et al., 2013). Further analysis indicated that high 
reactivity and more positive regulation abilities predicted higher levels of EF at 48 months, while 
high reactivity and poorer regulation abilities produced poorer executive abilities at 48 months. 
This suggests that early reactivity is moderated by the ability to regulate emotions in an adaptive 
way. Furthermore, the researchers found that positive parenting practices mediated the effect of 
reactivity on EF, such that children who were more reactive and demonstrated higher executive 
abilities also had parents who offered more support to their child during the fear evoking 
situations (Ursache et al., 2013). The authors suggest that this external regulation of emotions 
through the parents may lead to lower physiological arousal, which may subsequently free up 
cognitive resources conducive to fostering positive executive abilities (Ursache et al., 2013). 
Again it is unclear how these results would generalize to more mature samples. However, these 
results suggest an interaction of ER and emotional reactivity in the prediction of executive 
abilities. 
A study by Bridgett and colleagues (Bridgett, Oddi, Laake, Murdock & Bachmann, 2013) 
assessed whether these constructs were associated with each other in a sample of adults. This 
was done through the use of several behavioural measures to assess executive abilities and self-
report questionnaires to measure the expression and experience of negative affect. Overall, the 
researchers found that inhibition was specifically related to the expression of negative affect, but 
not the experience of negative affect, while working memory was related to the experience of 
negative affect, but not the expression of negative affect (Bridgett et al., 2013). The authors 
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suggest that this indicates that inhibition may be related to regulation of the overt expression of 
emotions similar to the ER strategy of expressive suppression. Additionally, Bridgett and 
colleagues propose that working memory may be related to the regulatory abilities that include 
altering the experience of emotions, such as cognitive reappraisal (Bridgett et al., 2013). 
Unfortunately, the researchers did not overtly measure whether these findings were related to 
increased use of expressive suppression or cognitive reappraisal through well-validated measures 
such as the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). Accordingly, it is impossible to know whether this 
hypothesis would be supported empirically. Nonetheless, this research provides some theoretical 
foundation for future research to build upon. 
A study by Gyurak and colleagues (Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller & Levenson, 2012) 
assessed abilities to down- and up-regulate both positive and negative emotions while watching a 
movie clip. Their sample included older adults with and without a diagnosis of a 
neurodegenerative disorder. Heart rate was recorded during the ER task. The researchers 
evaluated the participants EF abilities through four tasks. A single task was used to examine 
inhibition, working memory, switching and verbal fluency (Gyurak et al., 2012). Results 
indicated that ER ability was significantly related to measures of verbal fluency, but not to other 
measures of EF. The researchers propose that verbal fluency requires more complex planning 
and monitoring abilities than the other executive abilities measured, and accordingly may 
therefore be used more when regulating one’s emotions (Gyurak et al., 2012). This study 
provides some evidence that verbal fluency is related to successful up- and down-regulation of 
emotions across a spectrum of older adults. Unfortunately, these findings did not generalize to 
any of the core EF constructs. 
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Another study conducted by Phillips and colleagues (Phillips, Henry, Nouzova, Cooper, Radlak 
& Summers, 2014) compared the relationship of EF and ER between a group of individuals with 
a diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and healthy controls. The researchers evaluated ER, 
anxiety and depressive symptoms and quality of life through self-report questionnaires. 
Executive abilities, specifically sustained attention ability and verbal fluency, were measured 
using behavioural tasks (Phillips et al., 2014). Overall, they found that individuals with a 
diagnosis of MS scored significantly worse on all measures, and that within this group, emotion 
regulation ability was significantly related to verbal fluency (Phillips et al., 2014). This provides 
further evidence that ER is related to verbal fluency and supports research findings by Gyurak 
and colleagues (2012), who found similar results in a mixed sample of older adults with and 
without a neurodegenerative disorder. 
Across the aforementioned studies there is some indication that aspects of EF and ER share some 
commonality. Unfortunately, the most compelling evidence comes from research with young 
children. The other area where there is decent empirical data supporting a connection between 
ER and EF is in individuals who have a diagnosis of a neurological disorder. The study by 
Bridgett and colleagues (2013) does offer some hope in providing an indication that these 
concepts are related in typically developing young adults, although their operationalization of ER 
was inadequate to provide any confirmation of the relationship between ER and EF. Taken 
together, it is clear that these findings are quite inconclusive and future research is needed to 
determine whether an association between ER and EF truly exists. 
Through research on the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), 
expressive suppression has been linked to several negative outcomes such as experience of more 
negative emotions, less positive emotions, poorer interpersonal functioning and greater 
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psychological distress. Conversely, cognitive reappraisal has been linked to increased experience 
of positive emotions, reduced experience of negative emotions, better interpersonal functioning 
and improved well-being (Gross & John, 2003). Several other studies have considered 
difficulties with EF and ER in the development and maintenance of various mental health 
concerns. Dysfunctional EF has been commonly linked to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD; Barkley, 1997; Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010), major depressive disorder (MDD; Ikeda, 
Shiozaki, Ikeda, Suzuki & Hirayasu, 2013; Wingo, Kalkut, Tuminello, Asconape & Han, 2013), 
anorexia nervosa (Gillberg, Billstedt, Wentz, Anckarsater, Rastam & Gillberg, 2010), elevated 
state and trait anxiety (Visu-Petra, Miclea & Visu-Petra, 2013) and substance abuse (Wilens et 
al., 2011). Similarly, difficulties regulating  one’s emotions has been associated with ADHD 
(Melnick & Hinshaw, 2000), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD; Fraire & Ollendick, 2011) 
MDD (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Campbell-Sills, 
Simmons, Lovero, Rochlin Paulus & Stein, 2011), substance abuse, specific phobias, bipolar 
disorder (Gruber, Eidelman & Harvey, 2008) eating disorders, borderline personality disorder 
(Svaldi, Griepenstroh, Tuschen-Caffier & Ehring, 2012), and posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD; Fairholme, Nosen, Nillni, Schumacher, Tull & Coffey, 2013). This provides strong 
evidence that difficulties with both EF and ER are often related to mental health problems, and 
that there is a great deal of overlap in the presentation of mental health difficulties. It is, 
however, unclear as to whether these mental health issues are caused by difficulties with EF and 
ER, or whether these mental health issues may cause difficulties with EF and ER. Nonetheless, 
dysfunctional EF and ER seem to both co-occur with a wide variety of mental health concerns. 
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Purpose of the present study 
EF and ER share the function of self-regulation towards a goal. Additionally, difficulties with 
either of these abilities have been linked to a plethora of mental health difficulties. Furthermore, 
emotional reactivity has been suggested to be theoretically related to the successful use of 
various ER strategies. As of yet, however, very few research studies have examined the joint 
association of these two processes, or looked at factors, such as emotional reactivity, that might 
moderate this relationship. Accordingly, the current study aims to assess the degree to which EF 
and ER are related, replicate findings that implicate difficulties with these processes and mental 
health difficulties, and to examine emotional reactivity as a potential moderator of the 
relationship between EF, ER and mental health difficulties. Primarily, we are interested in how 
emotional reactivity will interact with EF and ER as predictors of mental health and emotional 
outcomes.  
In the current study, we expect that performance on EF tasks will be related to reported ER 
strategies. Specifically, we want to test the idea proposed by Bridgett and colleagues (2013) that 
cognitive reappraisal will be related to working memory, while expressive suppression will be 
related to inhibitory ability. We further predict that EF and ER strategies will be related to 
emotional experience and psychological well-being. Herein, we expect to replicate findings by 
John and Gross (2003) that relates cognitive reappraisal to more positive outcomes and less 
negative ones, and expressive suppression with more negative outcomes and less positive ones. 
Additionally, we predict that weak working memory and inhibitory ability will be associated 
with more psychological distress, and that, similar to Bridgett and colleagues (2013) findings, 
working memory will be related to less negative affect. Finally, based on results from Ursache 
and colleagues (2013) we predict that there will be an interaction between emotion regulation 
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and emotional reactivity in predicting emotional outcomes such that those with high emotional 
reactivity and high cognitive reappraisal, or low expressive suppression will report more 
adaptive emotional outcomes. Because we are not conducting a longitudinal study, indices of EF 
will not be entered as outcome variables. Accordingly, it is difficult to say what effect, if any EF 
will have on the relationship between reactivity and emotion regulation in predicting the 
experience of affect and psychological distress. 
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Methods 
Participants and procedure. 96 undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo 
participated in this study (Mean age = 20 years, 65% female, 77% native English speakers). Data 
were missing from 7 participants due to researcher error or technical issues. Data were excluded 
for 3 participants due to excessive errors. Data from 86 participants were entered into the 
analyses. Participants completed tasks in a single 90-minute session in the following order: 
Letter-number Sequencing, Flanker task, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), 
Automated Reading Span, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), Stop Signal task, Emotion 
Reactivity Scale (ERS), Automated Operation Span, Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI), Spatial 
Compatibility task, and a background questionnaire. Recruitment took place through a 
departmental pool of undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses who participated for 
course credit. 
Measures 
Working Memory Tasks 
 Letter-number Sequencing. This is an adaptation of the Letter-number Sequencing subtest 
of the WAIS-IV (Pearson, 2008), and requires the participant to repeat mixed up strings of letters 
and numbers of increasing length. Participants listened to an audio recording of the strings of 
numbers and letters and repeated them back to the experimenter stating with the numbers first in 
order, followed by the letters in alphabetical order. Letter-number strings were presented in 
blocks of three. After each block of three items, another letter or number was added to the 
sequence. Sequences ranged from two to nine letter-number combinations. If the participant 
failed to correctly repeat all three items in a block the task was discontinued. A total score is 
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derived by summing the number of correctly recalled trials. Scores can range from 0 to 30. The 
letter-number sequencing task has good internal consistency (α = .90; Pearson, 2008). 
Reading Span and Operation Span. These are automated versions of the Reading and 
Operation Span tasks (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock & Engle, 2005). In each task, participants are 
required to hold a string of letters in mind while they are concurrently asked to evaluate either 
math or reading problems presented to them in between each letter stimulus. In operation span 
participants are asked to evaluate simple math problems, while in reading span participants are 
required to figure out whether short sentences make logical sense. Participants are instructed to 
provide answers to the sentences or operations as quickly as possible while trying to keep their 
answers as accurate as possible. They are instructed to try to maintain 85% accuracy throughout 
the task. Their percentage correct responses is presented after every trial. These tasks present a 
total of 75 letters to participants in strings that range from 3 to 7 letters over 15 trials. An 
absolute score is derived from summing the total number of trials that the participant recalled all 
of the letters correctly. Scores range from 0-75. Both the internal consistency (α = .78) and test-
retest reliability (α = .81) for the operation span task have been shown to be satisfactory 
(Unsworth et al., 2005). Additionally, the internal consistency (α =.78 - .83) and test-retest 
reliability (α =.76) of the reading span task have been shown to be adequate (Redick et al., 2012). 
Inhibition Tasks 
 Spatial Compatibility. The Spatial Compatibility task (Simon & Rudell, 1967) requires 
participants to respond to a stimulus using the defined ‘red’ (left hand) or ‘green’ (right hand) 
key. On each trial a fixation cross appears at the centre of the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms). 
Following this a right or left pointing arrow appears on either the right or left side of the 
computer screen. Participants need to quickly and accurately respond to the direction the arrow is 
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pointing regardless of the side of the screen on which it is presented. On compatible trials the 
arrow is pointing in the same direction as the side of the screen it is on (e.g., the arrow is on the 
right side of the screen and it is pointing to the right), whereas the arrow is pointing opposite the 
direction as the side of the screen it is on during incompatible trials (e.g., the arrow is on the left 
side of the screen and is pointing right). The participant needs to inhibit responses to the spatial 
position of the stimulus on incompatible trials. On each trial the participant must respond within 
2000 ms, otherwise the trial is flagged as an omission. An average response time (RT) was 
calculated by assessing RT’s of correct responses to incompatible trials, wherein a faster 
response time reflected better inhibition. The task consists of 48 trials, in which 24 compatible 
and 24 incompatible trials are inter-mixed in a random order. 
 Flanker task. During the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) participants are to 
respond correctly to the direction of a middle arrow using the aforementioned ‘red’ or ‘green’ 
keys. On each trial participants are shown a fixation cross at the centre of the screen for 500 ms. 
This is followed by a set of five arrows in a horizontal line at the centre of the screen. The 
middle arrow is surrounded by arrows (flankers) that are facing the same way on compatible 
trials, and by arrows that are facing the opposite way on incompatible trials. Participants are 
required to inhibit responding to the direction of the flankers on incompatible trials. Again, 
responses over 2000 ms are recorded as an omission. An average RT was again determined by 
assessing RT’s of correct responses to incompatible trials. Again, faster response times are 
indicative of better inhibition. This task has 48 total trials, of which 24 are compatible trials and 
24 are incompatible trials inter-mixed in a random order. 
Stop Signal. The Stop Signal task (Logan, Cowan & Davis, 1984) requires participants to 
respond quickly and accurately to a red or green star that is presented on a monitor by either 
47 
 
hitting the ‘red’ or ‘green’ key. On each trial a central fixation cross appears for 500 ms, after 
which the green or red star appears. Participants need to inhibit their response when the red or 
green star is followed by a tone. This requires the participant to inhibit an immediate response to 
the stimulus until they are certain that a tone will not play, and then to respond quickly before the 
stimulus disappears. The stimulus disappears after 2000 ms if no valid response is detected. This 
task has four blocks with 32 trials per block. Eight of the 32, or 25% of the trials have the tone 
(no-go trials), while 24 trials (75%) do not have a tone (go trials). Participants are allowed a 
short break between testing blocks to reduce fatigue. Timing of the tone was determined using a 
dynamic tracking algorithm where individuals were able to inhibit their response on 
approximately 50% of trials. Accordingly, the tracking algorithm adjusts for individual 
differences between and within participants. The mean delay of the stop signal was subtracted 
from the average time taken to respond to the stimulus. This resulted in an index of response 
inhibition (SSRT). As with the other two tasks, faster response times correspond to better 
inhibitory ability. 
Self-report Questionnaires 
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The PANAS was used to assess how participants 
felt in general over the past few weeks. The PANAS is a 20-item scale, which requires 
participants to indicate how they have been experiencing both positive and negative mood 
adjectives (e.g. excited, afraid) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) very slightly or not at 
all to 5 (extremely). There are 10 items relating to positive affect and 10 items relating to 
negative affect. The PANAS has been validated to be used to measure affect over the past few 
weeks and in the present moment. The scale measuring affect over the past few weeks has good 
internal consistency for both the positive (α = .87) and negative factors at (α =.87) (Watson, 
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Clark & Tellegen, 1988). We found similar reliabilities for the positive affect (α = .9) and 
negative affect (α = .85) subscales. 
Emotion Reactivity Scale. The ERS is a 21-item scale that examines participants’ 
experiences of emotions when reacting to emotional events using a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all like me) to 4 (completely like me). The ERS measures three indices of 
emotional reactivity: emotional sensitivity, emotional persistence and emotional 
arousal/intensity. The emotional sensitivity subscale contains eight items such as, “my feelings 
get hurt easily”. The emotional persistence subscale is a three-item scale involving items such as, 
“when something happens that upsets me, it’s all I can think about for a long time”. The 
emotional arousal/intensity subscale has 10 items including, “when I experience emotions I feel 
them very strongly/intensely”. Items are summed to give an ERS total score with a range from 0 
– 84. The ERS demonstrates strong internal consistency with an overall alpha of .91 (Nock 
Wedig, Holmberg & Hooley, 2008). We observed similar internal consistency with an overall 
alpha at .93. 
 Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. The ERQ, developed by Gross and John (2003), 
assesses two widely used emotion regulation techniques, expressive suppression and cognitive 
reappraisal. There are six items assessing cognitive reappraisal and four items assessing 
expressive suppression measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). Items looking at cognitive reappraisal include questions such as, “when I want 
to feel more positive emotion, I change what I am thinking about”, while items measuring 
expressive suppression include items such as, “I control my emotions by not expressing them”. 
This 10-item scale has been shown to have satisfactory reliability for the expressive suppression 
(α = .73) and cognitive reappraisal factors (α = .79; Melka, Lancaster, Bryant & Rodriguez, 
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2011). For the ERQ subscales we observed an alphas of .65 for both cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression. 
 Brief Symptom Inventory. The BSI is a 53-item scale that asks participants about a wide 
range of psychosomatic symptoms that many people experience. The BSI is the shortened 
version of the Symptom Checklist – 90 (SCL-90) and includes indices for somatization, 
interpersonal sensitivity, phobic anxiety, depression, hostility, anxiety, paranoid ideation, 
psychoticism, and obsessive-compulsive tendencies, as well as a general symptoms index which 
reflects overall psychological distress (GSI). Responses are measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely) based on how much participants agree with the 
experience of the statements over the past week. The GSI is an average of all the subscales and 
has high internal consistency at α = .9 (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). In our study we observed 
similar internal consistency for the GSI at α = .95  
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Results 
Analytic Approach 
To reduce the number of EF measures used in analyses, composites were created by aggregating 
standardized scores on the working memory (Letter-number Sequencing, Operation Span and 
Reading Span) and inhibition (Flanker, Spatial Compatibility and Stop Signal tasks) measures. 
To retain similarity with the outcome measure from the Stop Signal task (i.e., the SSRT), we 
controlled for participant’s processing speed in both the Flanker and Stop Signal tasks by 
entering compatible trial RTs on these tasks in regression models predicting incompatible trial 
RTs and saving residuals from these analyses. Residuals from both these tasks were then 
standardized and added to the standardized SSRT to form an inhibition composite. Correlations 
between tasks forming the inhibition and working memory composites are presented in Tables 1 
and 2. All performance-based and questionnaire data were inspected for univariate, bivariate, and 
multivariate outliers and for normality. Four outliers were identified for having an incompatible 
average RT that was over three standard deviations above the group mean on the Flanker task. 
There was also one outlier identified for having an incompatible average RT that was over three 
standard deviations above the group mean on the Spatial Compatibility task and one outlier with 
an average SSRT that was over three standard deviations above the group mean on the Stop 
Signal task. All outliers had the outlying average RT’s reduced to three standard deviations 
above the mean. No multivariate outliers were identified and all dependant measures were 
approximately normally distributed.  
Related to the first aim, bivariate correlations were used to examine associations between EF 
abilities (i.e., WM and inhibition) and ER strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression). To address the second aim, which was to examine the independent and joint 
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association of EF and ER with psychological well-being, three separate multiple regressions 
models were created in which positive affect, negative affect and psychological distress were 
dependent variables and EF abilities (i.e., WM and inhibition), ER strategies (i.e., cognitive 
reappraisal and expressive suppression), and interactions involving EF and ER (e.g., WM x 
cognitive reappraisal) were mean centred and entered simultaneously as predictors. All variables 
were centered prior to creation of the interaction terms. To address the final aim of the study, 
which was to examine how the independent and joint association of EF and ER with 
psychological well-being may vary as a function of emotional reactivity, similar regression 
models were run with emotional reactivity as an additional predictor (e.g., emotional reactivity, 
emotional reactivity x inhibition, emotional reactivity x inhibition x cognitive reappraisal). In 
each analysis, significant effects (i.e., p <.05) are interpreted and trends (i.e., p <.10) are 
reported. Means and standard deviations for all measures are presented in Table 3. The multiple 
regression models described above were tested using PROCESS (Hayes, 2014) to investigate the 
locus of the interactions. The simple slopes for the association the predictors were tested at low 
(-1 SD below the mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean) levels (see Aiken & West, 1991). 
Association of EF and ER 
As shown in see Table 2, there was no significant association of inhibition with either cognitive 
reappraisal, r = .12, p = .29, or expressive suppression, r = .02, p = .86. Similarly, working 
memory was not significantly associated with either cognitive reappraisal, r = .14, p = .19, or 
expressive suppression, r = -.07; p = .50. 
 
 
52 
 
Independent and joint association of EF and ER for affect and psychological distress 
With positive affect as the dependant variable, 21% of the variance was explained by predictors 
in the model (R2 = .21, F(8, 77) = 2.62, p =.014). Significant predictors included cognitive 
reappraisal (β = .31, t(77) = 2.93, p =.005) and expressive suppression (β = -.24, t(77) = -2.31, p 
= .023), as well as the interaction between expressive suppression and inhibition (β = -.21, t(77) 
= -2, p = .049) (Figure 1). Subsequent analyses demonstrated there was a trend-level effect of 
inhibition on positive affect at low levels of expressive suppression, t(82) = 1.86, p = .066, but 
not at high levels of expressive suppression, t(82) = -.37, p = .71. This trend-level interaction 
suggests that those who use less expressive suppression experience more positive affect when 
they have low inhibitory skills than when they have high inhibitory ability. Conversely, there is 
no difference in amount of positive affect reported between high and low inhibitory ability for 
those reporting high use of expressive suppression. For negative affect as the dependent variable, 
the model was not significant (R2 = .16, F(8, 77) = 1.85, p =.081). Finally, a regression with 
psychological distress as the outcome variable explained 31% of the variance (R2 = .31, F(8, 77) 
= 4.23, p < .001). In this model, expressive suppression (β = .40, t(77) = 4.16, p < .001) and 
inhibition (β = -.24, t(77) = -2.44, p = .017) were significant predictors and there was also a trend 
towards a significant interaction of inhibition and cognitive reappraisal (β = .19, t(77) = 1.92, p = 
.058). Results are presented in Table 3. 
Independent and joint association of EF and ER with psychological well-being as a function of 
emotional reactivity 
For positive affect as the dependant variable, the model including emotional reactivity and all 
other predictors was no longer significant (R2 = .31, F(17, 68) = 1.8, p = .052). For negative 
affect as the dependent variable, a model with all predictors explained 53% of the variance (R2 = 
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.53, F(17, 68) = 4.56, p < .001). Emotional reactivity was a significant predictor (β = .62, t(68) = 
6.02, p < .001), as was the interaction of emotional reactivity and inhibition (β = -.33, t(68) = -
2.98, p = .004) (Figure 2). Simple slopes analysis revealed a significant effect of inhibition on 
negative affect for both high (t(82) = 2.44, p = .017) and low (t(82) = -2.04, p = .045) levels of 
emotional reactivity – albeit in the opposite direction. The interaction suggests that those high in 
emotional reactivity had more negative affect when they also had higher inhibitory ability, while 
those low in emotional reactivity had less negative affect when they also had higher inhibitory 
ability. Finally, a regression with psychological distress as the outcome variable explained 68% 
of the variance (R2 = .68, F(17, 68) = 8.32, p < .001). In this model, emotional reactivity (β = .64, 
t(68) = 7.37, p < .001) and expressive suppression (β = .26, t(68) = 3.41, p = .001) were both 
significant predictors of psychological well-being. There were also trend-level interactions 
between cognitive reappraisal and inhibition (β = .17, t(68) = 1.93, p = .058) and between 
cognitive reappraisal, inhibition and emotional reactivity (β = .18, t(68) = 1.74, p = .087). Results 
are presented in Table 4. 
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Discussion 
Research has demonstrated that EF and ER are supported by a common neurological substrate 
and have common associations with affective experiences and mental-health; however, no 
studies to our knowledge have simultaneously explored the unique and joint effects of EF and 
ER relative to emotional outcomes in a single multivariate model, nor have any examined how 
these associations may be moderated by individual differences in emotional reactivity. To 
address this gap in our knowledge, the current study was undertaken to investigate the interplay 
of EF, ER, and emotional reactivity vis-à-vis positive and negative affect and psychological 
distress. Specific questions included (1) what association is present between EF abilities and ER 
strategy use, (2) how are EF and ER related to positive and negative affect and psychological 
distress, and (3), what impact does emotional reactivity have on the relationship between EF and 
ER on emotional outcomes. To address these questions, participants completed self-report 
questionnaires measuring emotion regulation, emotional reactivity, emotional experience and 
psychological distress. They also completed a battery of EF tasks measuring inhibition and 
working memory. 
Regarding the first question that was addressed in our study, we hypothesized that EF abilities 
and ER strategies would be related. In the current study, however, we found no evidence to 
support the idea that inhibition and working memory are associated with cognitive reappraisal or 
expressive suppression. Although EF and ER are both self-regulatory skills, the lack of 
association suggests that individual differences in working memory and inhibitory abilities are 
not predictive of the extent that an individual uses either cognitive reappraisal or expressive 
suppression in an effort to regulate his/her emotional experiences. Contrary to our null findings, 
this association has been demonstrated in previous research. For example, a study with healthy 
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preschool-aged children found that children who had better inhibitory ability also demonstrated 
increased expressive suppression (Carlson & Wang, 2007). Whilst this study points to a 
correlation of EF and ER, longitudinal research has found that these constructs may be causally 
related (Ursache et al., 2013). Specifically, it was found that more adaptive ER at 15 months of 
age predicted better-developed executive abilities at age four. Interestingly, this effect was 
moderated by emotional reactivity, such that only those were high in emotional reactivity who 
demonstrated a positive impact of ER at 15 months on EF later in development. Both EF and ER 
undergo significant development during early childhood through to adolescence. Thus, these 
findings may suggest that EF and ER have a stronger relation during childhood due to similar 
developmental trajectories (Huizinga et al., 2006; Lehto et al., 2003; Silvers et al., 2012), but 
diverge later in development, perhaps explaining why we found no evidence of association 
between EF and ER in young adulthood.  
It also is worth noting that a few studies have examined associations between EF and EF in 
adulthood. Two studies with neurologically compromised adults that suggest that EF and ER 
may be related beyond the childhood years. One study of a sample of individuals with a 
diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis found that ER ability was positively related to verbal fluency 
(Philips et al., 2014), which was replicated in another study of individuals with a diversity of 
neurodegenerative disorders (Gyurak et al., 2012). Though verbal fluency is not traditionally 
viewed as an EF ability, it has been suggested that this ability requires organization and planning 
which are central to goal oriented behaviour (Gyurak et al., 2012). Also in opposition to our 
findings, a study by Bridgett and colleagues (2013) has proposed a link between working 
memory and cognitive reappraisal, and inhibition and expressive suppression in a healthy adult 
sample. Although the authors did not formally test this hypothesis, they found that increased 
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inhibitory ability was related to lower expression of negative emotions, while high working 
memory ability was associated with decreased experience of negative affect. In their discussion 
the authors suggested that the expression of negative emotions could relate to expressive 
suppression and that the experience of negative emotions might be associated with cognitive 
reappraisal. In the current study, we found no evidence that cognitive reappraisal or expressive 
suppression were related to working memory or inhibition, nor were we able to replicate the 
finding that working memory was associated with the experience of negative affect. Given that 
no research with healthy adults has demonstrated this pattern of results, to our knowledge, it may 
be that these findings are particular to individuals with neurological disorders and would not 
generalize to adults in whom the brain has not been compromised.  
Given that in the current study working memory and inhibition were measured through 
performance measures while expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal were measured via 
self-report, it may be that the potential relationship between EF and ER was attenuated due to 
methodological differences in the measures that were used to assess each of these constructs. It 
also is worth mentioning that these measures may assess these constructs on differing time 
frames. For example, the ERQ asks individuals how they generally respond to their emotional 
experiences whereas performance measures of EF assess executive skills at a specific time point. 
It also has been suggested that performance-based measures of EF may not capture an 
individual’s ability to apply his/her executive skills in the more naturalistic environment of real 
life (Barkley, 1997; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2013). Although any or all of these explanations 
may account for the null finding reported in our study, we note that, recent research collected in 
our lab using only self-report measures to assess general EF and ER in young adults has also 
failed to find a reliable relationship between EF and ER – even with shared method variance and 
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sampling over a similar time frame. Though speculative, it may be the case that individuals are 
not able to accurately report on self-regulatory processes such as EF and ER. Future research 
could explore this idea by incorporating multi-informant ratings of these constructs (i.e., EF and 
ER ratings provided by self and others) and by also including direct measures of both EF and ER 
in addition to the rating scales in a single study.    
Regarding the second question that was addressed in our study, we hypothesized that positive 
affect would be predicted by cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression, that negative 
affect would be predicted by cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression and working memory 
and that psychological distress would be predicted by cognitive reappraisal, expressive 
suppression, working memory and inhibition. Our findings suggest that whilst EF and ER are not 
inter-related constructs, they are both predictive of affective experiences and psychological 
distress. For positive affect, individuals who endorsed more use of cognitive reappraisal also 
reported greater positive affect, while individuals who disclosed more use of expressive 
suppression reported lower positive affect. This finding is consistent with that of Gross and John 
(2003), who have reported that increased use of expressive suppression is associated with less 
positive affect and that increased use of cognitive reappraisal is related to more positive affect. 
Interestingly, we also found that positive affect was predicted by individuals’ inhibitory ability – 
however, the nature of this association was moderated by their endorsement of expressive 
suppression. Specifically, whilst there was no evidence of association between inhibition and 
positive affect for individuals who endorsed relatively high amounts of expressive suppression, 
there was a trend toward an association for individuals in whom use of expressive suppression 
was relatively low – such that lower levels of inhibition were associated with more positive 
affect. This interaction requires replication in future work, but raises the possibility that 
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individuals who use less expressive suppression may experience negative outcomes if they also 
have good inhibitory ability. As mentioned, Carlson and Wang (2007) have found that good 
inhibitory ability was related to increased expressive suppression. Thus, expressive suppression 
may be beneficial to emotional outcomes when inhibition is strong. However, this would suggest 
that those high in suppression with good inhibitory ability should show the opposite trend which 
we did not find in our study. Future research should aim to replicate our findings with a larger 
sample size to support or refute this hypothesis. 
Regarding the third aim of the study, we hypothesized that emotional reactivity would moderate 
effects of ER use such that those high in emotional reactivity who also utilized less expressive 
suppression or more cognitive reappraisal would have more adaptive outcomes (i.e., more 
positive affect, less negative affect and less psychological distress). In fact, inclusion of 
emotional reactivity added a considerable amount of explanatory power to models in which 
negative affect and psychological distress were outcomes. For negative affect, previous research 
has demonstrated that increased use of expressive suppression and decreased use of cognitive 
reappraisal is associated with increased negative affect (Gross & John, 2003). Interestingly, 
when emotional reactivity was entered as a predictor into our model, fewer of these results were 
found. Specifically, our results suggest that emotion regulation strategies do not uniquely predict 
negative affect once emotional reactivity and inhibitory ability are taken into account. Inspection 
of our significant emotional reactivity x inhibition interaction revealed an interesting pattern of 
findings – namely, that inhibitory ability was positively associated with negative affect for 
individuals low in reactivity (i.e., better inhibition predicted less negative emotion), but was 
negatively associated with negative affect for individuals high in reactivity (i.e., better inhibition 
predicted more negative emotion). Regarding this interaction, the finding that low reactive 
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individuals who have higher inhibition experience less negative affect than low reactive 
individuals with lower inhibition is supported by prior research. Tang and Schmeichel (2014) 
used a lab-induced emotional manipulation prior to completing inhibitory tasks and found that 
better inhibitory ability was predicted by the absence of negative feelings. They acknowledged 
that reactivity may further impact the degree to which negative feelings are endorsed or regulated 
and that this may in turn affect inhibitory ability. Though the authors did not directly test what 
effect reactivity had on this relationship, it may help to explain the pattern of results that we 
found in the current study.  
While we found results similar to what was observed in the research study by Tang and 
Schmeichel (2014) for low reactive individuals, we found that highly reactive individuals with 
high inhibition experience more negative affect than those with low inhibitory ability. Given the 
strong predictive effect of emotional reactivity on negative affect it might be that this interaction 
is performance dependent based upon the individuals typical affective state. This would mean 
that those high in emotional reactivity are typically higher in negative affect and that they 
perform better on inhibitory tasks under these conditions. An example that might parallel this 
situation would be those who perform better under pressure versus those who do not perform 
well under pressure. There are a couple of limitations to this explanation however. Firstly, if it 
were true that performance on inhibitory tasks was dependent upon typical affective state then 
one might expect a similar trend regarding the interaction between working memory ability and 
emotional reactivity on negative affect – which was not observed in our study. Secondly, since 
there is also a predictive effect of emotional reactivity on psychological distress it stands to 
reason that there should also be a significant interaction between emotional reactivity and EF 
abilities and psychological distress. Exploration of this idea with post-hoc analyses, with 
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inhibitory ability as the predictor and reactivity as the moderator, produced the same pattern for 
psychological distress as an outcome measure (i.e., those who are highly reactive and have lower 
inhibitory ability have lower psychological distress than highly reactive individuals with high 
inhibitory ability); however, the opposite trend for low reactive individuals is not present (see 
Figure 3). It would be interesting to know how reactivity might affect scores on measures of EF 
that assessed how individuals function in general as opposed to measuring EF at one particular 
time. It would be reasonable to hypothesize that differences between the low and high reactivity 
groups might disappear. This could be due to the measure not being performance based and thus 
EF ability would not be affect state dependant. Another option would be to have individuals 
tested at multiple times and have measures of affect and psychological distress administered 
directly before each time-point assessing how they are feeling at that time. This could then be 
compared to performance on EF tasks at different time-points and measures of emotional 
reactivity, affect and psychological distress based on how participants feel in general. Yet 
another option might include comparing two groups of individuals on EF tasks. The first group 
would complete EF tasks involving an emotional component similar to research carried out by 
Tang and Schmeichel (2014). This would provide measures of emotional reactivity and ER 
strategies that could be measured through self-report or behavioural observation. The second 
group would complete unemotional measures of EF, such as the ones involved in the current 
study. These two groups could then be compared based on between group differences on EF 
measures as well as within groups via differences in emotional reactivity. 
For psychological distress, a model without emotional reactivity revealed that individuals who 
endorsed more use of expressive suppression and who had better inhibitory ability endorsed 
more mental-health concerns. The finding that expressive suppression shares a positive relation 
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with psychological distress replicates findings by Gross and John (2003) suggesting that 
expressive suppression is related to more negative psychological outcomes. However, it is 
interesting that higher inhibitory ability was associated with more psychological distress as well. 
Based on previous research examining the association between executive dysfunction and mental 
health difficulties (Barkley, 1997; Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010; Gillberg et al., 2010; Ikeda et al., 
2013; Wingo et al., 2013; Visu-petra et al., 2013), it was expected that better inhibitory ability 
would be related to less psychological distress. Nonetheless, this particular result is at least 
consistent with our finding that those who use less expressive suppression report less positive 
affect when they have low inhibitory ability. When emotional reactivity was added to the model, 
reactivity and expressive suppression were both significant predictors but the previously 
observed effect of inhibition was no longer apparent. It is clear that emotional reactivity has a 
strong effect on psychological distress and negative affect even when controlling for ER strategy 
use. Moreover, when reactivity was entered into the model inhibition dropped out as a significant 
predictor of psychological distress. Thus, future research involving EF and ER should control for 
related emotional reactivity awareness when considering effects of EF and ER on emotional 
experience and psychological distress. 
The current study adds to our understanding of the ways in which EF, ER, and emotional 
reactivity contribute to emotional experiences and mental-health; however, our findings should 
be interpreted in the context of several limitations. First, our sample consisted of primarily 
female undergraduate students who may not be representative of the general population. 
Replicating this work with additional groups (e.g., adult community samples, older populations 
or adolescent samples), may attest to the generalizability of our findings or identify possible 
boundary conditions of our results. Second, we only measured inhibition and working memory at 
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one time-point. Although we used three tasks to get a reliable composite of EF abilities, it would 
have been ideal to get multiple measures of these abilities, as any of the participants could have 
been having an exceptionally good or bad day based on amount of sleep, stress, or physical 
health reasons. Research has shown that performance on EF tasks are reduced during sleep 
deprivation (Tucker, Whitney, Belenky, Hinson & Van Dongen, 2010), and under stress 
(Schoofs, Wolf & Smeets, 2009). Third and related to the last point, sleep, stress, and physical 
health could have biased participants’ responses to emotional measures such as the PANAS, 
ERQ, ERS or BSI. Measuring these constructs at multiple times would have also been useful. 
Finally, self-report measures of self-regulatory abilities such as EF and ER require a certain 
amount of insight, which those deficient in these abilities may not have. Accordingly, obtaining 
physiological or behavioural information indicating use of ER strategies would have been 
beneficial in measuring this construct. Future research should aim to rely less heavily on self-
report measures to get a more objective index of self-regulatory abilities.  
In conclusion the current study explored the relationship between EF, ER, emotional reactivity 
and emotional and psychological outcomes. Although we were unable to extend findings 
indicating a relationship between EF and ER, indicators from both of these constructs were 
predictive of positive affect, negative affect and psychological distress. Furthermore, emotional 
reactivity significantly impacted the relationships of expressive suppression on negative affect 
and expressive suppression and inhibition on psychological distress. This suggests that emotional 
reactivity has a role in explaining these relationships and future research examining aspects of 
EF and ER should include this construct. 
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Figure 1. Interaction between inhibition and expressive suppression on positive affect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
H i g h  I n h i b i t i o n L o w  I n h i b i t i o n
P
o
si
ti
ve
 A
ff
ec
t
Low Suppression
High Suppression
73 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction between inhibition and emotional reactivity on negative affect. 
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Figure 3. Interaction between emotional reactivity and inhibition on psychological distress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
H i g h  I n h i b i t i o n L o w  I n h i b i t i o n
P
sy
ch
o
lo
gi
ca
l D
is
tr
es
s
Low Reactivity
High Reactivity
75 
 
Table 1.  
Correlations between tasks comprising the inhibition composite. 
Construct 1 2 3 
1. Flanker** -   
2. Stop Signal .37* -  
3. Spatial Compatibility**  .30* .35* - 
* p < .05 
** Processing speed is controlled for within these tasks  
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Table 2.  
Correlations between tasks comprising the working memory composite. 
Construct 1 2 3 
1. Reading Span -   
2. Operation Span .55** -  
3. Letter-number Sequencing  .43** .36* - 
* p < .05 
** p < .001 
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Table 3.  
Means and standard deviations of all predictors and outcome variables. 
Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
ERQ: Cognitive Reappraisal (sum) 30.94 5.25 
ERQ: Expressive Suppression (sum) 15.01 4.46 
ERS Total (sum) 29.52 15.16 
Inhibition Composite  -.22 1.97 
     Flanker Incompatible RT (ms) 452.88 60.93 
     Spatial Compatibility Incompatible RT (ms) 520.98 84.96 
     Stop Signal RT (ms) 303.35 50.28 
Working Memory Composite  .20 2.33 
     Operation Span (absolute score) 44.94 17.9 
     Reading Span (absolute score) 35.77 17.13 
     Letter-number Sequencing (total correct) 21 2.21 
Total PANAS Positivity  30.67 6.85 
Total PANAS Negativity  22.48 8.47 
Average General Severity Index  .81 .61 
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Table 4.  
Correlations between cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression, working memory and 
inhibition. 
Construct 1 2 3 4 
1. Cognitive Reappraisal -    
2. Expressive Suppression -.11 -   
3. Working Memory .14 -.07 -  
4. Inhibition .12 .02 -.12 - 
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Table 5.  
Regression with ER strategies and EF abilities as predictors of positive affect, negative affect 
and psychological distress. 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect General Severity Index 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Expressive 
Suppression 
-.37* .16 .57* .20 .06** .01 
Cognitive 
Reappraisal 
.42* .15 .12 .17 .009 .01 
Inhibition 
 
.36 .36 -.21 .47 -.07* .03 
Working 
Memory 
-.04 .31 -.27 .39 .03 .03 
Suppression 
x Inhibition 
-.15* .08 -.20* .10 -.006 .006 
Suppression 
x Working 
Memory 
.004 .08 -.04 .10 .004 .006 
Reappraisal 
x Inhibition 
-.09 .06 .004 .08 .01† .005 
Reappraisal 
x Working 
Memory 
-.01 .07 -.01 .09 .007 .006 
R2 .21* .16 .31** 
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .001 
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Table 6.  
Regression with ER strategies, EF abilities and emotional reactivity as predictors of positive 
affect, negative affect and psychological distress. 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect General Severity Index 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Emotional 
Reactivity 
.07 .06 .35** .06 .03** .003 
Expressive 
Suppression 
-.46* .17 .26 .17 .04** .01 
Cognitive 
Reappraisal 
.42* .15 .18 .15 .02 .009 
Inhibition 
 
.27 .46 .51 .46 -.03 .03 
Working 
Memory 
-.008 .32 -.55 .32 .02 .02 
Reactivity x 
Suppression 
.02 .01 -.005 .01 .000 .001 
Reactivity x 
Reappraisal 
.01 .01 -.005 .01 .000 .002 
Reactivity x 
Inhibition 
.02 .03 -.09* .03 -.002 .002 
Reactivity x 
Working 
Memory 
.004 .02 -.02 .02 .000 .001 
Suppression 
x Inhibition 
-.25* .10 -.05 .10 .004 .006 
Suppression 
x Working 
Memory 
.06 .09 -.12 .09 .001 .005 
Reappraisal 
x Inhibition 
-.07 .07 -.10 .07 .009 .004 
Reappraisal 
x Working 
Memory 
.04 .08 -.07 .08 .006 .005 
Reactivity x 
Inhibition x 
Suppression 
.01 .007 -.007 .007 .000 .000 
Reactivity x 
Inhibition x 
Reappraisal 
.003 .006 .009 .006 .001 .000 
Reactivity x 
Working 
Memory x 
Reappraisal 
-.01 .005 -.001 
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Reactivity x  
Working 
Memory x 
Suppression  
-.006 .007 -.003 .007 .000 .000 
R2 .31† .53** .68** 
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .001. 
 
